[PUBLIC] avian-flu-diary (B3) "UKHSA Hantavirus Update: Cryptic Mention of a Suspected Case on Tristan Da Cunha" Avian Flu Diary (Mike Coston) — zoonotic outbreak commentary, 2026-05-08

Summary: #19,149 The online signal-to-noise ratio regarding the hantavirus outbreak continues to degrade with several `false alarms ' making the rounds yesterday, and the arrival of the highly vocal ` plandemic ' contingent, who view this outbreak as some sort of vast global conspiracy. Finding credible, informative, reports is made even more difficult by the tendency of governments to downplay risks to reassure a nervous public. While I still believe this outbreak should be containable - there are a lot of moving parts - many of which we probably aren't aware of. It now appears at least 30 people left the ship before the outbreak was recognized, and some may have had opportunities to spread the virus. All of which brings us to the UK's HSA announcement this morning that they are aware of a `suspected ' case on Tristan Da Cunha (stop #5 on the map above) ; a small volcanic island in the south Atlantic that is home to > 200 Brits. Exactly why they suspect this person is infected - or their condition - is not stated. Nor do they say how the person was likely exposed (was this a passenger, a local resident, etc.?) . If confirmed ( and that's still an `if' ), this would be a significant turn of events. First today's statement, after which I'll have a bit more. Statement from the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA), Department for Health and Social Care (DHSC), and Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) The UK government continues to work with international authorities in preparing for the arrival of British nationals to the UK from the MV Hondius cruise ship where an outbreak of Hantavirus was confirmed by the World Health Organization. Two British nationals have confirmed hantavirus, with an additional suspected case of a British national on Tristan da Cunha . None of the British citizens onboard are currently reporting symptoms but they are being closely monitored. The ship is expected to dock in Tenerife on Sunday , according to the latest updates from the Spanish Health Ministry. UK government staff will be on the ground ready to support the British nationals disembarking. British Passengers and ship crew not displaying any symptoms of hantavirus will be escorted by UK Government staff to an airport and given free passage back to the UK. FCDO and UKHSA teams will be on the ground to support these arrangements, bolstered by a Rapid Deployment Team sent from the UK. The FCDO is chartering a dedicated repatriation flight for British ship passengers and crew only. This flight will be free of charge. UKHSA is working with partners to ensure the flight operates under strict infection control measures. Public health and infectious disease specialists from UKHSA and the NHS will be on board to monitor British Nationals whilst on the flight, to ensure that preventative measures are in place and to provide any care in the unlikely event that any passengers become unwell on the flight. All British passengers and crew on board the MV Hondius will be asked to isolate for 45 days upon returning to the UK and UKHSA will closely monitor these individuals, with testing as required. Follow up is already underway for individuals who may have been in contact with cases and have since returned to the UK or are in in UK Overseas Territories. The UK government will ensure those self-isolating are given appropriate support. UKHSA is aware of seven British Nationals who disembarked the ship at St Helena on 24 April. Two of those people have returned to the UK independently and are isolating at home in the UK. Neither of these individuals is currently reporting symptoms. They are receiving advice and support from UKHSA and have been advised to self-isolate. Four of these individuals remain in St Helena . A seventh individual has been traced outside of the UK. The FCDO is in direct contact with the ship and British nationals on board and has stood up consular teams across multiple countries to support British nationals. UK government is working very closely with international partners in response to this incident, including the cruise ship operator and the governments of UK overseas territories which were visited by the ship. UK government teams are working at pace to get medical support to all affected Overseas Territories. The Ministry of Defence has worked with UKHSA to provide vital diagnostic supplies, including PCR tests, which were delivered to Ascension Island via a military plane on 7 May. The risk to the general public remains very low. Professor Robin May, Chief Scientific Officer at UKHSA, said: This is an evolving situation, and we are working closely with partners to support British Nationals on board the MV Hondius. The risk to the general population remains very low and the public can be reassured that established infection control measures will be put in place at every step of the journey to ensure the safe repatriation of British passengers on board. Further information on the repatriation of British nationals will be provided in due course. While it may turn out due more to an unfortunate series of events than anything else, the world's health agencies became aware of this outbreak weeks after it started, and are playing catch up. Dozens of potentially infected individuals have scattered around the world, and they have had contact with hundreds - perhaps thousands - of people. Luckily, most won't have been infected, and based on past Andes virus outbreaks, transmission should be limited. At least that's the assumption right now. The UK has signaled its intention to have people to `isolate' (technically quarantine ) for 45 days after returning to the UK. Note: I suspect someone, somewhere, has determined that `quarantine ' is a scarier word than ` isolate ', but I digress. Right now, it isn't clear whether all other countries will follow suit, or whether they'll get the cooperation they'll need from those exposed. While unpopular, quarantine has proven its worth many times, including in halting the 2018-2019 outbreak of the Andes Virus in Argentina. Hopefully we'll take those lessons seriously.


[PUBLIC] avian-flu-diary (B3) "UKHSA Update On Hantavirus: 2 Nonsymptomatic Passengers Self-Isolating at Home" Avian Flu Diary (Mike Coston) — zoonotic outbreak commentary, 2026-05-06

Summary: #19,146 The UK's Health Security Agency has published an update this afternoon on the current status of British nationals aboard the m/v Honidius, which also includes details on two passenger s who apparently already left the ship, and - while showing no symptoms - are self-isolating at home. Given the large number of people who have been exposed aboard ship - and an unknown number of contacts offship - the use of home self-isolation (w ith daily phone check ins ) would seem a reasonable precaution; at least until we get a better handle on the infectivity of this strain. Whether other jurisdictions will adopt similar measures remains to be seen. The 2-8 week incubation period of the Andes Virus - and its early flu-like presentation - is likely to present public health agencies around the globe with a formidable challenge over the weeks ahead. UKHSA update on the hantavirus cruise ship outbreak Latest information on cases including British nationals. From: UK Health Security Agency Published 6 May 2026 The UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) continues to work with the World Health Organization (WHO), Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), and other international partners to prepare for the arrival of British nationals to the UK from the MV Hondius cruise ship where an outbreak of Hantavirus was confirmed . Three people , including one British national, with suspected hantavirus have been evacuated from the Hondius in order to receive medical care in the Netherlands in co-ordination between the Cape Verde, UK and Dutch governments. UKHSA are in close contact with medical teams providing their care. The remaining British nationals can now be repatriated once the ship docks at its next destination if they do not develop symptoms. None of the British citizens onboard are currently reporting symptoms but they are being closely monitored. The FCDO is making arrangements for these individuals to return to the UK, where UKHSA is working with government to support them to isolate with regular testing and contact with healthcare professionals. UKHSA is aware of two people who have returned to the UK independently having been on board the MV Hondius. Neither of these individuals is currently reporting symptoms. They are receiving advice and support from UKHSA and have been advised to self-isolate. UKHSA are supporting a small number of individuals identified as close contacts of those on the boat. They are being offered support and are also self-isolating. None are reporting any symptoms. The risk to the general public remains very low. Dr Meera Chand, Deputy Director for Epidemic and Emerging Infections at UKHSA said: Our thoughts are with all those affected by the hantavirus outbreak onboard the MV Hondius. It’s important to reassure people that the risk to the general public remains very low. We are standing up arrangements to support, isolate and monitor British nationals from the ship on their return to the UK and we are contact tracing anyone who may have been in contact with the ship or the hantavirus cases to limit the risk of onward transmission. UKHSA will continue to work closely with government partners to offer all necessary support. UKHSA is working closely with the FCDO, the Home Office, and Border Force to trace further individuals who may have been on the same flight as a confirmed case, in order to carry out public health risk assessments and ensure appropriate precautionary measures are in place. Hantavirus is the name given to a group of viruses carried by rodents and transmitted by their droppings and urine. They can cause a range of diseases from mild, flu-like illness to severe respiratory illness. Infections in humans are rare and tend to occur in places where people and rodents coexist - most commonly in rural, agricultural settings, though the viruses can also sometimes be found in cleaning sheds, barns and holiday homes where rodents might have nested. Most hantaviruses do not spread easily between humans, although person-to-person transmission has been observed in some cases involving particular strains. The World Health Organization is leading the international response to this incident and overseeing direction of the ship, including advising on how to minimise the risk of the disease spreading. The FCDO is in direct contact with the ship and has stood up consular teams across multiple countries to support British nationals. UK government is working extremely closely with international partners in response to this incident, including the cruise ship operator and the governments of overseas territories which were visited by the ship. Further information on Hantavirus can be found in the recent blog from UKHSA .


[PUBLIC] avian-flu-diary (B3) "MOH Statements On Cruise Ship With Hantavirus Outbreak" Avian Flu Diary (Mike Coston) — zoonotic outbreak commentary, 2026-05-04

Summary: #19,139 Over the past hour the ever diligent newshounds at FluTrackers have posted several new statements from Ministries of Health along the route of the m/v Hondious - which is dealing with an unusual outbreak of Hantavirus among its passengers (see earlier blogs here, and here ). As I mentioned in my last blog, the ship is currently positioned off the port of Praia, Cabo Verde, and local authorities are not permitting passengers to disembark. There are reportedly two passengers in need of medical attention. The ( translated ) statement from their MOH follows: Health authorities are monitoring the situation of the cruise ship MV/NV Hondius with an outbreak of Hantavirus on board The Ministry of Health informs that it has been following, from the very first moment, the situation of the cruise ship MV/NV Hondius, which entered the waters of Cape Verde on May 3, following the notification by international health entities of an outbreak of respiratory illness on board, with the occurrence of serious cases and deaths. Following technical and epidemiological evaluation, the national health authorities decided not to allow the docking of the vessel in the Port of Praia, in application of the principle of precaution and in accordance with the International Health Regulation, in order to protect national public health. The vessel carries 147 people including passengers and crew. Of this total, three people present symptoms and were properly evaluated and assisted by a health care team, currently being clinically stable. Since then, the ship remains on the high seas under constant supervision from the health authorities. The necessary medical assistance is being provided by a team highlighted for the effect, consisting of specialist doctors, nurses, laboratory technicians and equally prepared measures for hospital responses for possible need for differentiated care Hospital Dr. Agostinho Neto. The situation is being properly monitored through coordinated work between the National Health Directorate, local health facilities, INSP, maritime and port authorities, with support from WHO Cape Verde/AFRO, RSI Focal Points and authorities from the Netherlands and the UK. This articulation has allowed for a swift, safe and technically appropriate response, ensuring patient clinical follow-up and preparation of all necessary precautionary measures, including possible medical evacuation by air ambulance of patients afterwards. It is ensured that the situation is under control, there is no risk to the population on earth, so far. We remain vigilant and in close coordination with national and international entities, ready to take any additional measures that may appear necessary. Information will be updated as the situation develops. The National Health Directorate calls for serenity and reaffirms its commitment to transparency, safety and protection of health for all. What is hantavirus ? Hantavirus is an acute and serious infectious disease, transmitted by wild rodents (rats). Caused by the virus of the genus Orthohantavirus, the infection occurs mainly by the inhalation of urine particles, feces or saliva from those rats, which can develop into cardiopulmonary syndrome (severe shortage of air) or, less commonly, kidney syndromes. Inhalation of contaminated particles — for example, during cleaning spaces with the presence of mice — is one of the most common forms of infection. The other forms of transmission to the human species are: 👉Percutanea, by means of skin abrasions or rodent bites; 👉Contact of the virus with mucosa (conjunctival, mouth or nose), through hands contaminated with rodent excrements; 👉 Person-to-person transmission, reported, sporadically, in Argentina and Chile, always associated with the Andes hantaviruses. The period of transmittibility of hantavirus in humans is unknown. Studies suggest that the period of maximum coming would be a few days before the onset of signs/symptoms. Already the incubation period of the virus, i.e. the period when the first symptoms begin to appear from the infection, is, on average, from 1 to 5 weeks, with variation from 3 to 60 days. The first signs of infection are often mistaken for flu: fatigue, fever, and muscle aches. In some cases headaches, dizziness, chills and abdominal problems also occur. However, the disease can progress quickly. Within a few days, more serious symptoms such as coughing, shortness of air and fluid accumulation in the lungs appear, which can lead to severe breathing difficulties. Meanwhile, the government of St. Helena, a small island (pop. 4900) in the South Atlantic where the ship stopped in late April, has issued the following statement: Suspected Hantavirus on MV Hondius May 4th, 2006 The public are advised that the Health and Social Care Portfolio have become aware of an evolving situation regarding a severe illness, affecting several passengers on the expedition vessel MV Hondius which recently visited St Helena between 22-24 April 2026. The suspected cause is hantavirus, which is usually spread through contact with infected rodents, but may eventually pass from person-to-person. Symptoms can include fever, extreme fatigue (feeling more tired than usual), muscle aches, stomach pain, nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea or shortness of breath. Some people may develop severe breathing difficulty requiring hospital care. Two passengers with minor symptoms came ashore and may have had some contact with members of our local community. While the virus can be serious, no cases of this illness have been identified in St Helena and there is no significant cause for concern on the island at this time. Public Health is working closely with the United Kingdom Health Security Agency (UKHSA) and other international partners to assess and manage the situation. A small number of people who travelled to St Helena on the MV Hondius or had very close contact with those who were showing symptoms, are being advised by Public Health to undertake a period of self-isolation as a precaution. St Helena Government (SHG) will provide full support to those who are asked to do so. A full risk-based contact tracing process is underway to identify and notify such persons. The risk to the wider community is low and no additional precautions are necessary at this time. However out of the abundance of caution, should you experience a significant fever (>38°C), then you should contact the hospital on tele No 22500 for advice , but please DO NOT attend in person at the first instance. For frequently asked questions about hantavirus, please visit: Hantavirus FAQ’s The public are thanked for their support and cooperation during this time. Further updates will be provided on a regular basis. #StHelena #Hantavirus #MVHondius Lastly, South Africa MOH has issued this statement : While the risks of transmission in these ports of call are low, they are not zero. And given the lengthy incubation period (1-5 weeks) of the virus, this is a going to require a protracted public health response.


[PUBLIC] avian-flu-diary (B3) "CDC Statement On Quarantine of Returning Passengers From the m/v Hondius" Avian Flu Diary (Mike Coston) — zoonotic outbreak commentary, 2026-05-09

Summary: #19,152 Late yesterday the CDC released a brief statement on how passengers from the m/v Hondius - currently enroute to the Canary Islands - will be repatriated and quarantined following potential exposure to the Hantavirus. While somewhat lacking in details, it clearly expresses the intent to quarantine returning passengers for an unstated period of time at the National Quarantine Center at the University of Nebraska. `Quarantine' refers to the sequestration of healthy-but-exposed individuals, while `isolation' refers only to symptomatic or confirmed infections. At this point, none of the 17 returning passengers are symptomatic. If symptoms were to develop, they would be moved to the Nebraska Biocontainment Unit . Long time readers will recall that we've seen the National Quarantine Center activated before, including 2018's Nebraska Medicine Statement On Patient Being Monitored Following Possible Ebola Exposure . While not explicitly stated, this appears to be a federally mandated quarantine, although I'm pretty sure they will ` ask nicely ' first. Between the CDC's Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine , and various other state and federal statutes, I'm sure they can enforce it if anyone resists. First the CDC's statement, after which I'll have a bit more. CDC Provides Update on Hantavirus Outbreak Linked to M/V Hondius Cruise Ship Statement For immediate release: May 8, 2026 CDC Media Relations (404) 639-3286 media@cdc.gov https://www.cdc.gov/media/ The U.S. government is actively monitoring and responding to a hantavirus outbreak linked to the M/V Hondius cruise ship. At this time, the risk to the American public remains extremely low. CDC developed health guidance for impacted American passengers, which was delivered by the U.S. Department of State. CDC's premier infectious disease experts are continuing to work closely with international partners to develop consistent monitoring guidance. This guidance will be distributed today, in addition to resources targeted for state and local health departments. The U.S. government's top priority is the safe repatriation of American passengers. These individuals are planned to be evacuated on a U.S. government medical repatriation flight to Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, Nebraska, where they will be transported to the National Quarantine Center at the University of Nebraska, Omaha. The CDC deployed a team of epidemiologists and medical professionals to the Canary Islands, where the M/V Hondius is expected to dock. The team will conduct an exposure risk assessment for each American passenger and provide recommendations for the level of monitoring required. An additional CDC team will deploy to Offutt AFB to support public health assessment of returning passengers. https://www.cdc.gov/hantavirus/about/index.html https://www.cdc.gov/hantavirus/about/andesvirus.html It is less clear how stringently individual states will handle the 6+ passengers who have already returned from the cruise ( reportedly to Georgia, Texas, Virginia, Arizona, and California). The Texas DSHS released as statement 2 days ago, which stated: DSHS statement on Texas residents who were on board the MV Hondius News Release May 7, 2026 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has notified DSHS that two Texas residents were passengers on the MV Hondius, a ship that experienced an outbreak of hantavirus while traveling in the Atlantic Ocean. The passengers left the ship and returned to the United States before the outbreak was identified. Public health workers in Texas have reached the two individuals, and they report they are not experiencing any symptoms and did not have any contact with a sick person while aboard the ship. They have agreed to monitor themselves for symptoms with daily temperature checks and contact public health officials at any sign of a possible illness. And yesterday the State of Virginia released: Hantavirus – Statement from the Virginia Department of Health Posted on May 7, 2026 Last Updated: May 8, 2026 As of May 7, 2026, please see the Virginia Department of Health’s statement: The Virginia Department of Health is monitoring this situation closely and has been in active communication with our federal partners at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). To date, one Virginia traveler who was on the MV Hondius disembarked the ship and has returned home. This person is currently in good health and is under public health monitoring. To protect the privacy of this person, no further details will be shared about this individual. Our understanding is that fewer than 30 U.S. Citizens were on board the ship. A small number (<5) of other potentially exposed Virginians might be identified in the days ahead. Exactly what ` under public health monitoring ' means isn't detailed. Neither state mentions restricting social contacts or activities, but that could change given the CDC's announced plan of action. While I'm still reasonably confident that this outbreak can be contained, that assumes everyone takes the threat seriously, and does what is needed to nip this in the bud. Regardless of how this outbreak resolves itself, this is a sobering reminder of how quickly the threat board can change.


[PUBLIC] avian-flu-diary (B3) "ECDC: Threat Assessment Brief On Hantavirus Cluster on a Cruise Ship" Avian Flu Diary (Mike Coston) — zoonotic outbreak commentary, 2026-05-06

Summary: #19,145 With the caveat that it is still early days, we've a Threat Assessment Brief this afternoon from the ECDC on the ongoing outbreak aboard the m/v Hondius which is currently enroute to the Canary Islands. As we've seen often in the past, assumptions and recommendations about exotic or novel disease outbreaks are subject to change as more data is gathered, so stay tuned. Due to its length, I've only posted the summary below. Follow the link to read it in its entirety. Hantavirus-associated cluster of illness on a cruise ship: ECDC assessment and recommendations Assessment 6 May 2026 This is a rapidly evolving incident, and this document contains a preliminary assessment and recommendations. ECDC will provide updates as information becomes available. As of 6 May 2026, seven cases have been reported in a hantavirus-associated cluster of illness on a cruise ship, including three deaths, one critically ill, two symptomatic and one with unknown status. Epidemiological situation ECDC was notified on 2 May 2026 by the Netherlands via the European Union (EU) Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) about a cluster of unknown disease with severe respiratory symptoms on a cruise ship in the South Atlantic, operating under a Dutch flag. There were 149 people on board from 23 different nationalities, including nine EU/EEA Member States: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Spain. At the time, two people had died and one had been medically evacuated to South Africa, where the person remained critically ill. A PCR test result for a sample taken from this person came back positive for hantavirus on 3 May 2026. As of 6 May, a total of seven people had presented with symptoms that included fever, respiratory symptoms, and gastrointestinal symptoms, with at least four rapidly progressing to pneumonia, acute respiratory distress and shock. Of these seven people, three died, one was medically evacuated to South Africa and admitted to an intensive care unit (ICU), two remained symptomatic on board, requiring medical assistance, and one was diagnosed after disembarking the ship and returning to Switzerland. In total, samples from two patients tested positive for hantavirus by PCR; a sample from one additional patient tested positive for Andes virus (ANDV) by PCR. Further laboratory investigations are ongoing. Orthohantavirus infections are viral zoonotic diseases transmitted to humans primarily through the inhalation of aerosols contaminated with the urine, faeces or saliva of infected rodents. Human disease can be caused by several orthohantavirus species, including the Andes (ANDV) and Sin Nombre (SNV) viruses in the Americas and Puumala and Dobrava viruses in Europe. The incubation time is usually around two weeks but ranges from seven days up to six weeks. Clinical manifestation of hantavirus infection is divided in two clinical syndromes: Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome (HPS), seen in the Americas; and Haemorrhagic Fever with Renal Syndrome (HFRS) seen in Europe and Asia. Severe cases can rapidly deteriorate and become life-threatening. ANDV is a hantavirus primarily found in South America that causes HPS with a high fatality rate. Human-to-human transmission is rare but has been documented in the case of ANDV. No effective antiviral treatment is available; supportive care is key for a better chance of survival. ECDC provides this risk assessment for discussion at the level of the Health Security Committee including the involved countries, UK HSA and the WHO. Risk assessment Person-to-person transmission of ANDV has only been documented following close and prolonged contact. The current hypothesis is that some passengers were exposed to ANDV while spending time in Argentina before embarking, where ANDV is endemic, and may subsequently have transmitted the virus to other passengers onboard the cruise ship. At this early stage of the investigation with limited available information, we consider everyone on the ship to be close contacts , due to the closed setting and shared social areas and activities, aligned with the precautionary principle. Measures are already implemented on board to reduce the likelihood of infection for passengers and crew on the cruise ship. The cruise ship company and the relevant port authorities have also been advised on how to prepare for the management of cases and contacts (e.g. isolation of cases, use of appropriate personal protective equipment, testing, etc). Even if transmission of ANDV were to happen from passengers evacuated from the ship, ANDV does not transmit easily so it is unlikely that it would cause many cases or a widespread outbreak in the community, if infection prevention and control measures are applied. In addition, the natural reservoir for ANDV is not present in Europe, so introduction to the rodent population and potential rodent-to-human transmission in Europe is not expected. The risk to the general population in the EU/EEA from ANDV spreading from this cruise ship outbreak is very low. Recommendations Symptomatic people should be managed proactively and medically evacuated as soon as possible. Upon disembarking, diagnostic testing should be carried out by serology or PCR in people with symptoms. However, negative test results may not exclude infection and subsequent virus shedding. The EURL-PH-ERZV offers diagnostic services to EU/EEA countries lacking capability to diagnose ANDV infection. Passengers and crew should practice usual enhanced precautions (e.g. frequent handwashing, respiratory etiquette, physical distancing) and vigilant symptom monitoring while on the cruise ship. Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) guidance for healthcare settings who are caring for symptomatic individuals include standard and droplet precautions, which can be escalated to airborne precautions in the event that aerosol-generating procedures are performed. Risk communication should be tailored to the different target groups recognising their different levels of risk, information needs and responsibilities. Communication should clearly state what is known, what is unknown, and what may change as investigations progress with timely updates. Disembarking passengers should be provided with clear instructions and recommendations until their diagnosis is confirmed or ruled out. ECDC actions Epidemiological updates. Hantavirus infection factsheet published. European Union Reference Laboratory (EURL-PH-ERZV) offered assistance to EU/EEA national reference laboratories for the diagnosis of ANDV. ECDC is supporting the response operations through the EUHTF remotely and on the cruise ship in coordination with the affected countries. Ongoing collaboration with partners and affected countries on common case definitions and protocol for management of cases and contacts. Hantavirus-associated cluster of illness on a cruise ship: ECDC assessment and recommendations English (403.61 KB - PDF)


[PUBLIC] avian-flu-diary (B3) "Sci Adv: Mammary and Respiratory Infection of Sheep with H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b Viruses with Milk-mediated Transmission to Lambs" Avian Flu Diary (Mike Coston) — zoonotic outbreak commentary, 2026-05-10

Summary: #19,154 While we await further news on the offloading of hantavirus exposed passengers from the m/v Hondius , we still have plenty of older and emerging threats to keep our eye on. Late last week a new study was published in Science Advances by Canadian researchers who investigated the susceptibility of sheep to both HPAI H5N1 and HPAI H5N5. Since the first outbreak of HPAI H5N1 was reported in U.S. dairy cattle a little over 2 years ago, surveillance and testing of mammalian livestock has focused almost exclusively on lactating dairy cows. Yet during this time, we've also seen sporadic HPAI spillovers into goats , alpacas , pigs , and sheep in the UK and the discovery of H5N1 antibodies in sheep in Norway . Other non-bovine findings include: Transboundary & Emerg Inf: Serological Evidence of HPAI (H5N1) in Invasive Wild Pigs in Western Canada , Preprint: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5 Virus Exposure in Goats and Sheep (in Pakistan) . EID Journal: Evidence of Influenza A(H5N1) Spillover Infections in Horses, Mongolia Livestock surveillance - even of cattle - remains passive and limited, despite the call from animal health authorities (see WOAH Statement (Oct 22nd): High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) in Cattle ) to increase vigilance. Although cattle-centric, WOAH does refer to ` cattle and other livestock populations ' in their messaging, but until now spillovers into sheep, goats, and other non-bovie ruminants have been often dismissed as either rare or dead end infections. Today's study illustrates that small ruminants are not only susceptible to HPAI H5 infections; there is the potential for ` widespread virus transmission within flocks'. The authors discuss the need for increased surveillance and the implementation of stricter biosecurity measures , particularly in mixed-species environments. First the link, abstract, and some excerpts from a much longer study. Follow the link to read it in its entirety. I'll have a bit more after the break. Mammary and respiratory infection of sheep with H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b viruses with milk-mediated transmission to lambs Tamiru N. Alkie , Carissa Embury-Hyatt , Anthony V. Signore , Estella Moffat , Darwin Ramos , Sugandha Raj , Tamiko Hisanaga , Ifeoluwa Ayilara , Daniel S. Sullivan , [...] , and Yohannes Berhane 9 authors Authors Info & Affiliations Science Advances 8 May 2026 Vol 12, Issue 19 Abstract H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b viruses are evolving rapidly, expanding host ranges and threatening animal and public health. In the US, genotype B3.13 dominates dairy outbreaks, while D1.1 is linked to fewer cases. In the UK, an asymptomatic ewe infected with genotype DI.2 raised concerns about ruminant susceptibility. We inoculated lactating and nonlactating sheep with D1.1 (H5N1) and A6 (H5N5) viruses . Intramammary inoculation in lactating sheep caused clinical mastitis, high viral loads in milk, and transmission to suckling lambs, which further spread infection to the uninoculated mammary glands. Both ewes and their lambs seroconverted. Aerosol exposure of nonlactating sheep led to transient respiratory infection, with low-level viral replication, and seroconversion. In vitro, both viruses replicated in sheep mammary epithelial cells . These findings establish sheep as a viable ruminant model for H5N1 and H5N5 infection and highlight previously unidentified transmission dynamics, including milk-mediated and lamb-to-ewe spread, relevant for surveillance and biosecurity in ruminant populations. (SNIP) Deep sequencing of milk samples from mammary glands, oral swabs, and lung tissues revealed the emergence of viral variants distinct from the consensus sequence generated from the challenge D1.1 virus. Notably, the left mammary gland of a D1.1-infected sheep appeared to select for the variant PB2-701N , while the right gland retained mixed residues of PB2-627 (E/K) and PB2-701 (D/N) . Sequence analysis suggests that the PB2-D701N mutation arose before transmission to the left gland, as oral swab from one suckling lamb already carried this mutation. Dairy cows experimentally infected with H5N1 via the intramammary route acquired PB2-E627K mutation ( 32 ). While D1.1 viruses from some dairy cases exhibited the mammalian adaptive mutation PB2-D701N, the genotype B3.13 from all dairy cases retained the bovine-specific PB2-M631L mutation ( 74 ). Both PB2-E627K and PB2-D701N provide IAVs with significant replication advantages in mammalian hosts and enhanced viral transmission ( 75 , 76 ). (SNIP) The findings from this study have significant implications, even though there are limitations such as small sample sizes and the lack of assessment of transmission from inoculated mammary glands to uninoculated glands from the environment. However, all experimental studies in dairy cows revealed the restriction of infections and virus replication to infected quarters only. Our experimental approach has demonstrated that small ruminants are susceptible to H5N1 infections. The detection of seropositive goats and sheep during periods of heightened H5N1 activity underscores the necessity for more extensive investigations within the small ruminant herds . Once mammary infections with H5N1 have occurred in some lactating ruminants, virus can spread between the udders of lactating ruminants during suckling as some neonates could access milk from cohoused multiple lactating mothers. This scenario suggests potential for widespread virus transmission within the flocks. We suggest increased surveillance and the implementation of biosecurity measures, especially in mixed-species livestock systems or where large numbers of lactating ruminants and their neonates were cohoused or allowed to graze on communal pastures. Moreover, similar to infected dairy cows , milk obtained from infected lactating small ruminants was found to harbor higher levels of infectious viruses. This raises important zoonotic considerations in areas where raw milk consumption is common. Furthermore, the handling of infected small ruminants poses risks to human health , highlighting the need for thorough risk assessments to be carried out. (Continue . . . ) Whether sheep, goats, or other small ruminants will ultimately increase the risk of HPAI remains unknowable, but it does give the virus more places where it can hide, thrive, and potentially make genetic improvements. Mixed-species farms are particularly worrisome, as they provide novel viruses with access to numerous hosts, and fresh opportunities to reassort or adapt (see Study: Seroconversion of a Swine Herd in a Free-Range Rural Multi-Species Farm against HPAI H5N1 2.3.4.4b Clade Virus ). While the evidence of HPAI H5's growing host range continues to mount, the $64 question remains; can we adapt to the threat faster than the threat is adapting to us? Stay tuned.


[PUBLIC] avian-flu-diary (B3) "Switzerland FOPH: Patient Hospitalized in Zurich with Hantavirus Infection - Left Ship in Late April" Avian Flu Diary (Mike Coston) — zoonotic outbreak commentary, 2026-05-06

Summary: #19,143 Overnight Switzerland has reported that a former passenger on the m/v Hondius - who left the ship (with his wife) in late April to return home to Zurich - has been hospitalized with Hantavirus, and that testing has confirmed the Andes Virus. While not unexpected, this is the first confirmation of the virus type I've seen. Authorities are conducting contact tracing, but are quick to reassure the public that the risk of further cases in Switzerland are low. This does raise the possibility, however, that other non-shipboard cases might arise. I expect we'll be getting additional information from the WHO, ECDC, and other relevant authorities in the hours and days ahead. Press release published on May 6, 2026 Patient with hantavirus infection is receiving hospital treatment Bern, May 6, 2026 — A person with a hantavirus infection is currently being treated at the University Hospital Zurich (USZ). The patient is a man who has returned to Switzerland and was previously a passenger on the cruise ship where several hantavirus cases have occurred. The USZ is prepared for such cases, can care for the patient, and ensure the safety of both staff and all patients. There is currently no danger to the Swiss population. In Switzerland, a person has tested positive for hantavirus. The man had returned from a trip to South America with his wife at the end of April. After experiencing symptoms, he consulted his family doctor by phone and went to the University Hospital Zurich (USZ) for testing. He was immediately isolated. A test conducted at the reference laboratory of the Geneva University Hospital (HUG) confirmed a positive result for hantavirus. Specifically, it is the Andes virus , a hantavirus found in South America. Unlike European hantaviruses, which are transmitted through the excrement of infected rodents, human-to-human transmission of the American hantavirus variant has been observed only rarely. However, transmission only occurs through close contact. Therefore, the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) considers the occurrence of further cases in Switzerland unlikely. The risk to the Swiss population is low. The patient's wife also traveled with him. She is currently asymptomatic and has self-isolated as a precaution . Cantonal authorities are investigating whether the patient had contact with anyone else during his illness. The patient is being treated at the University Hospital Zurich (USZ) under strict safety protocols. The USZ is a designated reference hospital for such illnesses. The Federal Office of Public Health (BAG) is in close contact with other bodies, such as the Canton of Zurich, the University Hospital of Zurich and Geneva, and the WHO, and is constantly coordinating with them and closely monitoring further developments. Hantavirus fever is rare in Switzerland. In recent years, there have been between 0 and 6 reported cases per year. Of these few cases, the vast majority were due to infections acquired abroad.


[PUBLIC] avian-flu-diary (B3) "At Least One Evacuated American Passenger From m/v Hondius Tests Positive for Hantavirus" Avian Flu Diary (Mike Coston) — zoonotic outbreak commentary, 2026-05-11

Summary: #19,156 Overnight the HHS announced that - of the 17 evacuated Americans from the m/v Hondius - 1 (currently asymptomatic ) individual has tested positive for Hantavirus, and a second individual has shown `mild symptoms '. While the mantra has been that testing of asymptomatic individuals was unlikely to yield positive results, this is a reminder that there are very few absolutes when it comes to viruses and human physiology. We discussed the possibility of asymptomatic spread of the Andes Virus a week ago, and while evidence is sparse, studies have suggested (see Serological Evidence of Hantavirus Infection in Apparently Healthy People from Rural and Slum Communities in Southern Chile ) that at least some infections may be mild or asymptomatic. A more recent 2025 study (see Virological characterization of a new isolated strain of Andes virus . . . ), published in PloS NTD reported: In this work, we described the isolation of the strain responsible for the largest ANDV PTP transmission outbreak, which occurred in the small town of Epuyén and began on November 2, 2018. This strain, ARG-Epuyén, exhibited a high capacity for PTP transmission, necessitating the implementation of quarantine measures to curtail further spread [ 8 ]. The median reproductive number (the mean number of secondary cases caused by an infected person) was 2.12 before control measures were implemented and subsequently dropped to below 1.0 by late January. Early intervention allowed for the collection of samples leading to the isolation of this new ANDV strain from an asymptomatic case . An early passage of this strain was sequenced, revealing only one amino acid difference from the virus recovered from the patient. Like the Andes/ARG strain, this strain was able to grow in a new host without needing adaptation [ 26 ]. So while rare, there is precedent for positive test results from asymptomatic individuals. What isn't well understood is whether - or how effectively - asymptomatic ( or presymptomatic ) individuals may be able to transmit the virus. The ECDC's Threat Assessment Brief , published on May 6th, had this to say: Do asymptomatic individuals have a role in transmission? Current very limited evidence does not support a significant role for asymptomatic individuals in hantavirus transmission, supporting active symptom monitoring of asymptomatic exposed individuals. Infectivity is highest on the first day of symptom onset, which indicates a high likelihood of some infectiousness one-two days before onset of symptoms. While a lot of governments, eager to reassure the public, are quick to equate asymptomatic with `healthy ', the reality is far more nuanced. Given its lengthy incubation period, an exposed individual's status can change in a matter of hours. Which is why - while not wanting to use the dreaded ` Q ' word - exposed individuals around the world are being segregated and monitored for symptoms. While I remain far from convinced that this Andes virus outbreak will turn into a global public health emergency, there are enough unknowns here to command our respect and attention. And even if the current strain of ANDV is incapable of bigger things, evolution is a thing. Meaning that anything we say today about the virus may not hold true tomorrow.


[PUBLIC] avian-flu-diary (B3) "Brief Background on the Suspected Hantavirus Outbreak On A Cruise Ship (ex Argentina)" Avian Flu Diary (Mike Coston) — zoonotic outbreak commentary, 2026-05-03

Summary: Note: The newshounds at FluTrackers are following media reports ( see thread ) of a hantavirus outbreak aboard a cruise ship ( MV Hondius, bound from Ushuaia in Argentina to Cape Verde ), where 2 or 3 passengers have reportedly died, and several more are apparently infected. While details are scarce, I've prepared a backgrounder on the virus, and what we currently know about today's events. #19,137 Hantaviruses - which are carried by rodents in many parts of the world - are contracted by humans primarily through the inhalation or ingestion of aerosolized rodent feces, urine, saliva. While relatively uncommon, some of these viruses have demonstrated limited human-to-human transmission. Some - like Europe's Puumala Virus - produce relatively mild illness, while others like North America's Sin Nombre Virus and the South American Andes Virus can carry a high fatality rate. In 2019 we closely followed an unusually large outbreak in Argentina where over a period of 3 months, a total of 29 laboratory-confirmed cases of Hanta Pulmonary Syndrome ( HPS ), including 11 deaths - were reported in Epuyén, Chubut Province. The WHO DON report stated: The index case had environmental exposure prior to symptom onset on 2 November, and subsequently attended a party on 3 November. Six cases who also attended the party experienced the onset of symptoms between 20-27 November 2018. An additional 17 cases, all of whom were epidemiologically-linked to previously confirmed cases , experienced symptom onset between 7 December 2018 and 3 January 2019 (Figure 1). Potential human-to-human transmission is currently under investigation. In that outbreak, the incubation period ran from 8 to 31 days. The CDC notes incubation can run anywhere from 1 to 5 weeks , and some studies have suggested up to 8 weeks . Hantavirus in humans is almost always a dead-end infection, but in recent years the Andes virus (ANDV) has garnered a reputation for being a bit of an outlier. Following the above outbreak, the NEJM published “Super-Spreaders” and Person-to-Person Transmission of Andes Virus in Argentina , which warned: ANDV Epuyén/18−19 strain shows a facility ( R>2) for sustaining continuous chains of transmission if no control measures are enforced. While we don't know if this hantavirus is the ANDV Epuyén/18−19 strain , the fact that it appears to have infected 5 or 6 passengers is a concern. The ship in question ( HV Honidus ) reportedly carries up to 174 passengers, and 74 crew, and departed Argentina in early April. This ship appears to have been on a `polar exploration cruise ', then proceeding on to South Africa and Cape Verde. While we don't have a solid timeline, according to media report s , in late April a 70 y.o. passenger died on board, and his 69 y.o. wife subsequently fell ill ( she reportedly died in a Johannesburg hospital ). A third passenger has reportedly died ( unconfirmed ), and 3 more passengers are supposedly sick ( 1 hospitalized in Johannesburg ),while two are in isolation awaiting the next port. Given this is Sunday, there's very little in the way of official confirmation of these reports. Hopefully we'll get more details in the next day or two. While more cases are possible - with appropriate control measures, this outbreak should be manageable - although the long incubation period will certainly complicate matters. For more on hantaviruses, you may wish to revisit: Two Recent Studies On the Host Range of Hantaviruses In the United States California: Mono County Reports 3rd Hantavirus Death EID Journal: Experimental Infection of Peromyscus Species Rodents with Sin Nombre Virus MMWR: A Little Bit Of Seoul (Virus)


[PUBLIC] avian-flu-diary (B3) "Argentina MOH: Statement and Special Report On Recent Hantavirus Activity" Avian Flu Diary (Mike Coston) — zoonotic outbreak commentary, 2026-05-05

Summary: National Epidemiological Surveillance System (BEN) Week 16 #19,141 While the origins of the hantavirus infection currently spreading aboard a cruise ship in the Atlantic remain unknown, the ship embarked from an Argentine port on April 1st, making the Andes Virus a potential suspect. Yesterday, the Argentine MOH released a statement, which provides us with additional information on the ship's recent itinerary , along with a recap of hantavirus cases in the region. First some (translated) excerpts from the statement: The Ministry of Health is monitoring, along with international organizations, the hantavirus cases reported on the MV Hondius ship. The national health ministry is maintaining a technical and epidemiological exchange with international and provincial authorities to gather official information on the confirmed cases on the Dutch-flagged cruise ship. (Excerpt) On May 2, our country's National Centre for Epidemiology received notification of a cluster of severe acute respiratory illnesses on board the cruise ship, including three deaths and one passenger with laboratory confirmation of hantavirus. The transmission route is currently unknown, and further testing is ongoing at the South African National Reference Laboratory to identify the strain and origin of the outbreak. The crew and passengers remain in isolation, and those affected have been transferred to receive the necessary medical care. The vessel, which had departed from Montevideo, entered the port of Ushuaia on November 16, 2025 . From there, it made several coastal voyages between Ushuaia, the Antarctic sector, and the islands of the South Atlantic. On April 1, 2026, it set sail for South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Saint Helena, and other points in the South Atlantic. The province of T ierra del Fuego reported no significant health-related events. It is worth noting that Tierra del Fuego has no hantavirus and has not registered any cases since this disease was added to the list of notifiable events in our country in 1996. Its neighboring province, Santa Cruz, only registered one case in 2004. Currently, the Southern region is in a safe zone, with only 10 cases reported in Neuquén, Río Negro, and Chubut during the 2025-2026 season, which began on July 29 of last year. (Continue . . . ) While the ship has been operating out of a region of the country without any history of hantavirus activity , it is always possible a passenger was exposed somewhere else prior to boarding the ship. Yesterday the Argentine MOH released an update to their most recent Epidemiological bulletin , with a special focus on Hantavirus activity (and Mpox). I've provided a translation of the hantavirus section below. Special Report: Hantavirus On May 2, the Netherlands National Focal Point (NFP) notified the Argentine NFP of a hantavirus outbreak aboard a cruise ship with 147 passengers and crew from 23 different countries. The ship had departed from Ushuaia, Tierra del Fuego, on April 1 and was following a route through the South Atlantic with multiple stops. The ship is currently off the coast of Cape Verde, the country that will lead the response to the outbreak. To date, a total of 6 cases have been identified, of which 3 have resulted in death. All passengers and crew are in isolation and maintaining the necessary social distancing to prevent further infections. Patients with compatible symptoms have been transferred to receive appropriate medical care. The National Ministry of Health is in contact with the National Epidemiological Surveillance Centers (NECs) of the countries involved to gather information on the cases' itineraries prior to boarding, the type of contact they had on the cruise ship, and the identification of close contacts. The National Institute of Infectious Diseases (ANLIS) "Carlos G. Malbrán" has also offered advice regarding laboratory diagnosis and the possibility of performing sequencing and genomic analysis of the samples. Given this situation, the National Epidemiological Surveillance System (BEN) reports that since epidemiological week 13, 9 new cases have been reported nationwide , located in Buenos Aires Province (4 cases), Salta (3 cases), Jujuy (1 case), and Chubut (1 case) . So far this year, 42 new cases have been reported, and since the beginning of the season (epidemiological week 27 of 2025), the total number of confirmed cases has reached 101. The majority are concentrated in the Central region, with Buenos Aires Province reporting the most confirmed cases (42). However, the highest incidence rate corresponds to the Northwest region (0.60 cases per 100,000 inhabitants), where 36 confirmed cases have been registered, 83% of which are concentrated in Salta. Regarding the cases reported in the Southern region, the National Epidemiological Surveillance System (BEN) reports that one of the confirmed cases in Río Negro corresponds to the town of Río Colorado, located outside the historically endemic areas for hantavirus. In this context, environmental investigations were carried out in this town and other neighboring areas, and four potential exposure sites were identified. No species known to be reservoirs of pathogenic hantavirus were captured, and the specimens obtained tested serologically negative. Based on these findings, the jurisdictions were recommended to implement periodic environmental monitoring to assess the composition of rodent populations during periods of peak abundance and to identify the environments associated with reservoir species. Finally, during the current season, an intrafamilial cluster was recorded in the town of Cerro Centinela (Chubut), involving three related cases (cohabiting individuals) with sequential symptom onset dates . Following notification of the index case, the province conducted an environmental focus study and recorded the presence of wild rodents known as hantavirus reservoirs. One of the captured specimens even tested positive for the hantavirus. The epidemiological characteristics of the event raised suspicion of person-to-person transmission, prompting genomic analysis of the human samples. The results indicated that the sequences corresponded to the Andes virus, with a 99.99% similarity among the three cases analyzed. The results of the genomic sequencing of the virus detected in the seropositive rodent are still pending. (Continue . . . ) As the following MOH graphic illustrates, hantavirus activity tends to peak in the summer in Argentina (Nov-Dec-Jan), and reaches its nadir in the winter (May-Jun-Jul). It is still fairly active in March and April. We'll know a lot more once sequencing of the virus is complete, which will hopefully become available this week. Stay tuned.


[PUBLIC] avian-flu-diary (B3) "WHO DON: Update: Hantavirus Cluster Linked to Cruise Ship Travel, Multi-country" Avian Flu Diary (Mike Coston) — zoonotic outbreak commentary, 2026-05-05

Summary: AI generated with Gemini based on WHO narrative #19,140 It's been barely 40 hours since we first learned of the cluster of Hantavirus cases aboard a ship on a polar expedition cruise in the South Atlantic. The ship departed from Ushuaia, Argentina, on April 1st, and has made more than a half dozen stops (see map above), where passengers may have left the ship. While the exact Hantavirus has not been identified , the ship's departure point suggests the Andes Virus , which is often found in rodents in South America. The Andes virus would be particularly concerning because it is the only Hantavirus with an established reputation for being transmissible between humans (see NEJM “ Super-Spreaders” and Person-to-Person Transmission of Andes Virus in Argentina ). Complicating matters, the incubation period for Hantavirus can run up to 8 weeks , with a 42-day monitoring period generally recommended. Some cases can be mild, or even asymptomatic, but the CFR (case fatality rate) can reach 30%-60%. As of today's announcement from the WHO, there are now 2 confirmed cases , and 5 suspected cases; 3 have died, 1 remains hospitalized, and 3 remain aboard ship . There are also another 140+ individuals aboard the ship who may have been exposed, along with an unknown number potential contacts on shore ( including healthcare workers) . All of which will present some significant challenges for public health agencies across multiple jurisdictions. In impressively rapid fashion the WHO has produced a detailed DON ( excerpts below) , providing us with both a risk assessment and WHO advice. While ` . . . the WHO currently assesses the risk to the global population from this event as low. . . ', this is a dynamic situation, and no one is taking it lightly. Some of the public health challenges ahead include: Exactly how, when, and where the three symptomatic cases will be medically evacuated from the ship (and any others that might subsequently fall ill) How disembarkation of the remaining passengers and crew - and their ongoing medical monitoring - will be handled. Contact tracing - and health monitoring - of anyone that passengers may have had close contact with (now, and going forward) across multiple countries. I've reproduced large excerpts from the WHO DON below, but you'll want to follow the link to read it in its entirety. Hantavirus cluster linked to cruise ship travel, Multi-country 4 May 2026 Situation at a glance On 2 May 2026, a cluster of passengers with severe respiratory illness aboard a cruise ship was reported to the World Health Organization. The ship is carrying 147 passengers and crew. As of 4 May 2026, seven cases (two laboratory confirmed cases of hantavirus and five suspected cases) have been identified, including three deaths, one critically ill patient and three individuals reporting mild symptoms . I llness onset occurred between 6 and 28 April 2026 and was characterized by fever, gastrointestinal symptoms, rapid progression to pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome and shock. Further investigations are ongoing. The outbreak is being managed through coordinated international response, and includes in-depth investigations, case isolation and care, medical evacuation and laboratory investigations. Human hantavirus infection is primarily acquired through contact with the urine, faeces, or saliva of infected rodents. It is a rare but severe disease that can be deadly. Although uncommon, limited human to human transmission has been reported in previous outbreaks of Andes virus (a specific species of hantavirus). WHO currently assesses the risk to the global population from this event as low and will continue to monitor the epidemiological situation and update the risk assessment. Description of the situation On 2 May 2026, WHO received notification from the National International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) Focal Point of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereafter referred to as the United Kingdom) regarding a cluster of severe acute respiratory illness, including two deaths and one critically ill passenger, aboard a Dutch-flagged cruise ship. On 2 May 2026, laboratory testing conducted in South Africa confirmed hantavirus infection in one patient who is critically ill and in intensive care. On 3 May, one additional death was reported. A further three suspected cases remain on board. As of 4 May, a total of seven (two confirmed and five suspected) cases, including three deaths, have been reported. The vessel departed Ushuaia, Argentina, on 1 April 2026 and followed an itinerary across the South Atlantic, with multiple stops in remote and ecologically diverse regions, including mainland Antarctica, South Georgia, Nightingale Island, Tristan da Cunha, Saint Helena, and Ascension Island. The extent of passenger contact with local wildlife during the voyage, or prior to boarding in Ushuaia remains undetermined. The vessel carries a total of 147 individuals, including 88 passengers and 59 crew members. Onboard passengers and crew represent 23 nationalities. As of 4 May 2026, the vessel is moored off the coast of Cabo Verde. Summary of cases: Case 1 : An adult male developed symptoms of fever, headache, and mild diarrhoea on 6 April 2026 while on board the ship. By 11 April, the case developed respiratory distress and died on board on the same day. No microbiological tests were performed. The body of the passenger was removed from the vessel to Saint Helena (a British Overseas Territory) on 24 April. Case 2: An adult female, who was a close contact of case 1, went ashore at Saint Helena on 24 April 2026 with gastrointestinal symptoms. She subsequently deteriorated during a flight to Johannesburg, South Africa, on 25 April. She later died upon arrival at the emergency department on 26 April. On 4 May, the case was subsequently confirmed by PCR with hantavirus infection. Contact tracing for passengers on the flight has been initiated. Cases 1 and 2, had travelled in South America, including Argentina, before they boarded the cruise ship on 1 April 2026. Case 3: An adult male presented to the ship's doctor on 24 April 2026 with febrile illness, shortness of breath and signs of pneumonia. On 26 April, his condition worsened. He was medically evacuated from Ascension to South Africa on 27 April, where he is currently hospitalised in an Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Laboratory testing on an extensive respiratory pathogen panel was negative; however, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing confirmed hantavirus infection on 2 May 2026. Serology, sequencing and metagenomics are ongoing. Case 4: An adult female, with presentation of pneumonia, died on 2 May 2026. The onset of symptoms was on 28 April, with fever and a general feeling of being unwell. Three suspected cases have reported high fever and/or gastrointestinal symptoms and remain on board. Medical teams in Cabo Verde are evaluating the patients and collecting additional specimens for testing. Public health response Authorities from States Parties involved in the management of the event to date – Cabo Verde, the Netherlands, Spain, South Africa and the United Kingdom - have initiated coordinated response measures including: Ongoing engagement between WHO and the National IHR Focal Points of Cabo Verde, the Netherlands, South Africa, Spain and the United Kingdom, to ensure timely information sharing and coordination of response actions. WHO shared information about the events with National IHR Focal Points globally. Passengers onboard have been advised to practice maximal physical distancing and remain in their cabins where possible. Epidemiological investigations are underway to determine the source of exposure. The National IHR Focal Point of Argentina shared the passenger and crew lists with the National IHR Focal Points of the respective countries, according to each person’s nationality. In line with the Working Arrangement between the WHO Emergency Medical Team (EMT) Secretariat and the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), the EMT Secretariat has launched formal discussions to support the clinical management and medical evacuation of symptomatic passengers. Logistic support has been provided, including sample collection items. Laboratory testing and confirmation of hantavirus infection have been conducted at the National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD) of South Africa. Serology, sequencing and metagenomics are ongoing. Additional laboratory samples from symptomatic passengers are being sent, with WHO support, to the Institut Pasteur de Dakar, Senegal, for testing. WHO has activated three-level coordination and is supporting national authorities in implementing risk-based, evidence-informed public health measures in accordance with the provisions of the IHR and related WHO technical guidance documents. WHO risk assessment Hantavirus cardiopulmonary syndrome (HCPS), also known as hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS), is a zoonotic, viral respiratory disease caused by hantaviruses of the genus Orthohantavirus, family Hantaviridae, order Bunyavirales. More than 20 viral species have been identified within this genus. In the Americas, Sin Nombre virus is the predominant cause of HPS in North America, while Orthohantavirus andesense is responsible for most cases in South America. Human Hantavirus infection is primarily acquired through contact with the urine, faeces, or saliva of infected rodents or by touching contaminated surfaces. Exposure typically occurs during activities such as cleaning buildings with rodent infestations, though it may also occur during routine activities in heavily infested areas. Human cases are most commonly reported in rural settings, such as forests, fields, and farms, where rodents are present, and opportunities for exposure are greater. HPS is characterized by headache, dizziness, chills, fever, myalgia, and gastrointestinal problems, such as nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea, and abdominal pain, followed by sudden onset of respiratory distress and hypotension. Symptoms of HPS typically occur from 2-4 weeks after initial exposure to the virus. However, symptoms may appear as early as one week and as late as eight weeks following exposure. Hantavirus infections are relatively uncommon globally. In 2025 (as of epidemiological week 47), in the Region of the Americas, eight countries reported 229 cases and 59 deaths with a CFR of 25.7%. [1] In the European Region, 1885 hantavirus infection reported in 2023 (0.4 per 100,000), marking the lowest rate observed between 2019 and 2023.[2] In East Asia, particularly China and the Republic of Korea, Hantavirus haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (HFRS) continues to account for many thousands of cases annually, although incidence has declined in recent decades. Hantavirus infections are associated with a case fatality rate o f <1–15% in Asia and Europe and up to 50% in the Americas. While there are no specific treatment nor vaccines for hantavirus infections, early supportive care and immediate referral to a facility with a complete ICU can improve survival. Environmental and ecological factors affecting rodent populations can influence disease trends seasonally. Since hantavirus reservoirs are sylvatic rodents, transmission can occur when people come into contact with rodent habitats. Although uncommon, limited human‑to‑human transmission of HPS due to Andes virus has been reported in community settings involving close and prolonged contact. Secondary infections among healthcare workers have been previously documented in healthcare facilities, though remain rare. WHO currently assesses the risk to the global population from this event as low and will continue to monitor the epidemiological situation and update the risk assessment as more information becomes available. (Continue . . . )


[PUBLIC] avian-flu-diary (B3) "WHO Statement On Hantavirus Cases Aboard Cruise Ship" Avian Flu Diary (Mike Coston) — zoonotic outbreak commentary, 2026-05-04

Summary: #19,138 While we await further details on the (suspected ) Hantavirus outbreak aboard a cruise ship in the Atlantic (see yesterday's blog ) , we have the following brief statement by the World Health Organization. As of this posting, no DON has been published on this event, and that may not come for several days. Sequencing of the virus will not only tell us more about its origin ( is it the Andes strain? ), it could also help define transmission dynamics aboard ship. While the WHO's messaging remains low-key, they are obviously taking this outbreak seriously, as they have notified their NFPs (National Focal Points) according to the IHR regulations. The BBC this morning is reporting that local authorities will not permit passengers to leave the ship in Cape Verde in order `to protect the public' . It is not clear where or when the passengers will be allowed to disembark. Although human-to-human spread of the Andes virus has been documented (see EID Journal ), the Andes Virus is not believed to transmit as easily as COVID, influenza, and many other respiratory viruses. Transmission likely requires c lose, prolonged exposure to respiratory droplets or other bodily fluids . But there is still much we don't know about this virus, including its ability to spread asymptomatically . Studies have suggested (see Serological Evidence of Hantavirus Infection in Apparently Healthy People from Rural and Slum Communities in Southern Chile ) that at least some infections are mild or asymptomatic. A more recent 2025 study (see Virological characterization of a new isolated strain of Andes virus . . . ), published in PloS NTD reported: In this work, we described the isolation of the strain responsible for the largest ANDV PTP transmission outbreak, which occurred in the small town of Epuyén and began on November 2, 2018. This strain, ARG-Epuyén, exhibited a high capacity for PTP transmission, necessitating the implementation of quarantine measures to curtail further spread [ 8 ]. The median reproductive number (the mean number of secondary cases caused by an infected person) was 2.12 before control measures were implemented and subsequently dropped to below 1.0 by late January. Early intervention allowed for the collection of samples leading to the isolation of this new ANDV strain from an asymptomatic case. An early passage of this strain was sequenced, revealing only one amino acid difference from the virus recovered from the patient. Like the Andes/ARG strain, this strain was able to grow in a new host without needing adaptation [ 26 ]. All reasons why public health officials will want to proceed cautiously as they work to contain this outbreak.


[PUBLIC] avian-flu-diary (B3) "WHO Statement on 8th Hantavirus Case Now Hospitalized in Zurich" Avian Flu Diary (Mike Coston) — zoonotic outbreak commentary, 2026-05-06

Summary: #19,144 While I was tacking down and blogging the statement from the Swiss Authorities the World Health Organization posted their own statement on Twitter/X. In this statement, the WHO also acknowledges the identification of the Andes Virus , and states it is working with relevant countries to support international contact tracing of possible cases. This screenshot was posted shortly after 5am EST.


[PUBLIC] avian-flu-diary (B3) "ECDC: Rapid Scientific Advice on Management of Hantavirus Exposed Passengers" Avian Flu Diary (Mike Coston) — zoonotic outbreak commentary, 2026-05-09

Summary: #19,153 The ECDC has released their own set of recommendations for EU countries regarding the management of passengers returning from the m/v Hondius. It should be noted that this is an advisory document, and not a mandate. While these types of documents carry considerable weight, each member state can decide how to best manage the situation. I've provided the the summary, and a link to the full 8-page PDF below. Rapid Scientific Advice on the management of passengers - In the context of the Andes virus outbreak on the cruise ship MV Hondius Assessment 9 May 2026 As of 9 May 2026, a total of eight cases of Andes virus infection, including three deaths and one critically ill patient, linked to the M/V Hondius cruise ship have been reported. Key messages ECDC has classified all people on board the ship and for the purpose of disembarkation and repatriation to be high-risk contacts . Monitoring/quarantine up to six weeks (42 days); Day 0 = 6 May 2026. High-risk contacts: self-quarantine, daily symptom monitoring, test if symptomatic. Low-risk contacts: passive monitoring; isolate and test if symptoms develop. Flights: trace contacts for probable/confirmed cases only (same row ±2 rows on long flights). IPC: masking, one to two metres distancing, PPE for healthcare/cleaning Strong risk communication and misinformation management. This document provides advice for public health professionals in the EU/EEA managing individuals potentially exposed to ANDV, including on:Defining contact classification criteria based on level of exposure, including close and prolonged contact with symptomatic people; The identification, management and monitoring of contacts, including advice on testing. Appropriate infection prevention and control (IPC) measures for managing repatriated passengers and crew, suspected and confirmed cases and their contacts in healthcare and community settings; and Risk communication, community engagement and the management of misinformation. ECDC rapid scientific advice disclosure statement: ECDC issues rapid scientific advice to meet an emergent or urgent public health need or to quickly reply to external requests. To accommodate the accelerated timeline, the process and methods used for the development of rapid scientific advice may be modified from those of standard assessments and recommendations. Potential limitations are described. Publication file Rapid Scientific Advice on the management of passengers - In the context of the Andes virus outbreak on the cruise ship MV Hondius


[PUBLIC] avian-flu-diary (B3) "CDC HAN #00528: 2026 Multi-country Hantavirus Cluster Linked to Cruise Ship" Avian Flu Diary (Mike Coston) — zoonotic outbreak commentary, 2026-05-09

Summary: WHO Epi Chart of Probable & Confirmed Cases #19,151 While it remains to be seen whether the hantavirus outbreak aboard the m/v Hondius has `legs' , overnight the CDC published its first HAN advisory on the outbreak. The CDC’s Health Alert Network ( HAN ) is designed to ensure that communities, agencies, health care professionals, and the general public are able to receive timely information on important public health issues. Given the extended incubation period, and the co-circulation of other respiratory and gastrointestinal illness this time of year, we are likely to hear of a lot of `suspected' cases in the days and weeks ahead. While most will probably turn out to be false alarms, it is imperative that physicians maintain a high index of suspicion when dealing with epidemiologically linked patients. While primarily of interest to clinicians, I've reproduced the CDC HAN below. Follow the link for references. 2026 Multi-country Hantavirus Cluster Linked to Cruise Ship May 8, 2026 Distributed via the CDC Health Alert Network May 8, 2026 CDCHAN-00528 Summary The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is issuing this Health Alert Network (HAN) Health Advisory to inform clinicians and health departments about a new cluster of hantavirus disease cases caused by infection with Andes virus. Hantavirus disease can cause severe illness and can be fatal. Clinicians should be aware of the potential for imported cases, although the risk of broad spread to the United States is considered extremely unlikely at this time. As a precaution, this Health Advisory summarizes CDC's recommendations for U.S. public health departments, clinical laboratories, and healthcare workers about hantavirus disease case identiﬁcation, testing, and biosafety considerations in clinical laboratories. Background On May 2, 2026, the World Health Organization (WHO) was notified of a cluster of severe acute respiratory illness (SARI) among passengers and crew of a cruise ship in the Atlantic Ocean. The cluster included two deaths and one critically ill passenger, whose laboratory tests confirmed hantavirus. On May 6, 2026, WHO confirmed that the type of hantavirus responsible for this outbreak is the Andes virus. As of May 8, 2026, WHO has reported eight cases (six confirmed and two suspected), including three deaths. Investigations are ongoing to assess exposure risk of all Americans passengers on the cruise ship or who may have been exposed to an infected cruise ship passenger on an aircraft. The cruise ship departed from Ushuaia, Argentina, on April 1, 2026, and traveled across the South Atlantic Ocean, stopping at several remote locations, including Antarctica, South Georgia Island, Tristan da Cunha, Saint Helena, and Ascension Island. It carried 147 people (86 passengers and 61 crew) from 23 different countries. The extent of their contact with wildlife before or during the expedition is unknown. CDC is working with partners (federal government, state and local and international) on safely repatriating American passengers from the cruise ship to a facility in Nebraska with specialized medical capabilities. On May 7, 2026, CDC sent a team to meet the cruise ship in the Canary Islands, Spain following travel from Cape Verde, South Africa. The team is prepared to assess exposure risk among U.S. passengers and determine appropriate monitoring measures. CDC is also coordinating with international partners to align public health guidance and has already issued health guidance to affected Americans via the State Department. The risk to the public's health in theUnited States is considered extremely low at this time. As a precaution, CDC is working to increase awareness of the outbreak among travelers, public health agencies, laboratories, and healthcare professionals nationwide. Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome Hantaviruses are a group of viruses that can cause severe illness and death. They are most commonly transmitted (spread) to humans through contact with infected rodents (e.g., urine, droppings, saliva). Rarely, infection can occur from rodent bites or scratches. From 1993 through 2023, a total of 890 laboratory-confirmed cases of hantavirus were reported in the United States . In the Americas, hantaviruses can cause hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS), a severe and potentially deadly disease that affects the lungs. HPS can be life-threatening. Among patients who have severe respiratory symptoms, the case fatality rate has been estimated at approximately 38%. Andes virus, confirmed as the cause of this hantavirus outbreak, is the only type of hantavirus that has been documented to spread from person-to-person. Although rare, spread between people has typically required close, prolonged contact with a symptomatic person. This could include direct physical contact, prolonged time spent in close or enclosed spaces, and exposure to the infected person's saliva, respiratory secretions, or other body fluids (e.g., kissing, sharing utensils, handling contaminated bedding). Symptoms of HPS caused by Andes virus usually appear within 4-42 days after exposure. Early symptoms can include fever, fatigue, and muscle aches, especially in large muscle groups like the thighs, hips, back, or shoulders. Early symptoms such as fever, headache, muscle aches, nausea, and fatigue can be easily confused with influenza or other viral illnesses. About half of all HPS patients have experienced headaches, dizziness, chills, and gastrointestinal symptoms, including nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and abdominal pain. Late symptoms of HPS appear approximately 4-10 days after the initial phase of illness and can include coughing, shortness of breath, and chest tightness Individuals are generally only infectious while symptomatic. Early diagnosis of HPS can be difficult, especially within the first 72 hours of symptoms, before the virus can be accurately detected in body secretions and excretions . Repeat diagnostic testing is often done 72 hours after symptom onset . CLIA assays for detection of New World hantavirus IgM and IgG antibodies are available at CDC, some state public health laboratories, and Quest Diagnostics. For questions or concerns about submitting a specimen, please contact your state or local health department or CDC's Emergency Operations Center at 770-488-7100. No specific treatment is recommended for hantavirus infection; early supportive care is critical even before the diagnosis is confirmed. Patients with suspected HPS can deteriorate rapidly, and delayed care reduces the chance of survival. In severe cases, extra-corporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) can significantly improve survival (up to ~80%) if started early. Usually, the critical phase of disease is fairly short, and survivors can recover quickly. Recommendations for Healthcare Providers Be prepared to follow CDC's guidance under Appendix A: Type and Duration of Precautions Recommended for Selected Infections and Conditions | Infection Control | CDC . In healthcare settings, for patients with suspected or confirmed Andes virus infection, CDC recommends patient placement in an airborne infection isolation room and the use of a gown, gloves, eye protection, and an N95 or higher-level respirator when entering the patient's room. Include HPS in the differential diagnosis for an ill person who has compatible symptoms AND who has reported epidemiological risk factors, including at least one of the following, within the 42 days before symptoms onset: Had direct physical contact, or spent time in close or enclosed spaces, with a symptomatic person with confirmed or suspected Andes virus infection or with any objects contaminated by their body ﬂuids. Had exposure to an infected person's saliva, respiratory secretions, or other body fluids (e.g., kissing, sharing utensils, handling contaminated bedding). Experienced a breach in infection prevention and control precautions that resulted in potential contact with body ﬂuids of a patient with suspected or conﬁrmed Andes virus infection. Consider and perform diagnostic testing for more common illnesses as well, such as COVID-19 , inﬂuenza , and other common causes of gastrointestinal and febrile illnesses in an acutely ill patient with epidemiological risk factors and compatible symptoms. For More Information General Resources About Hantavirus | CDC About Andes Virus | CDC Reported Cases of Hantavirus Disease | CDC Hantavirus Prevention |CDC Clinician Resources Clinical Overview of Hantavirus | CDC Clinician Brief: Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome (HPS) | CDC Clinician Brief: Hemorrhagic Fever with Renal Syndrome | CDC Hantavirus Disease Trainings for Healthcare Providers | CDC Appendix A: Type and Duration of Precautions Recommended for Selected Infections and Conditions | Infection Control | CDC Health Department Resources Hantavirus Case Definition and Reporting | CDC


[PUBLIC] one-health (A2) "Epidemiological surveillance and genomic characterisation of betacoronavirus in Apodemus agrarius from Gyeonggi and Gangwon Provinces , Republic of Korea, 2017–2019" One Health (Elsevier, ISSN 2352-7714) — human/animal/environment interface, undated

Summary: Publication date: June 2026 Source: One Health, Volume 22 Author(s): Jongwoo Kim, Jin Sun No, Kyungmin Park, Seung-Ho Lee, Augustine Natasha, Haryo Seno Pangestu, Terry A. Klein, Heung Chul Kim, Won-Keun Kim, Jin-Won Song


[PUBLIC] google-news (C3) "Hantavirus outbreak origin still a mystery, medical experts address theories - 6abc Philadelphia" Google News (hantavirus query), 2026-05-13

Summary: Hantavirus outbreak origin still a mystery, medical experts address theories 6abc Philadelphia


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: GS1-177 (Orthohantavirus caobangense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445866.1. Country: China. Host: Anourosorex squamipes. Collected: 05-Aug-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: HQ162 (Orthohantavirus luxiense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445852.1. Country: China. Host: Eothenomys miletus. Collected: 03-May-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: HK9 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445842.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus andamanensis. Collected: 16-Aug-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: HK10 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445843.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus tanezumi sladeni. Collected: 16-Aug-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: GS1-166 (Orthohantavirus caobangense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445898.1. Country: China. Host: Anourosorex squamipes. Collected: 05-Aug-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: MLP5 (Orthohantavirus caobangense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445895.1. Country: China. Host: Anourosorex squamipes. Collected: 19-Jul-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: HK1 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445841.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus tanezumi sladeni. Collected: 16-Aug-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: GS1-175 (Orthohantavirus caobangense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445901.1. Country: China. Host: Anourosorex squamipes. Collected: 05-Aug-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: PM34 (Orthohantavirus fugongense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445904.1. Country: China. Host: Eothenomys cachinus. Collected: 21-Jul-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: DL1-64 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445892.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus norvegicus. Collected: 08-Jul-2021. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: PM37 (Orthohantavirus fugongense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445907.1. Country: China. Host: Eothenomys cachinus. Collected: 21-Jul-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: DL1-52 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-05

Summary: GenBank accession PX445889.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus nitidus. Collected: 24-Jun-2021. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: ANDV/Switzerland/Hu-3337/2026 (Orthohantavirus andesense) — Switzerland" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PZ385161.1. Country: Switzerland. Host: Homo sapiens. Collected: 2026-05-04. Segment(s): L. Deposited: 2026/05/11. Human case — molecular confirmation.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: HQ114 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445884.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus nitidus. Collected: 27-Feb-2022. Segment(s): L. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: MG105 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445883.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus norvegicus. Collected: 06-Jul-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: HK11 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445844.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus tanezumi. Collected: 16-Aug-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: CYR24 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445845.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus tanezumi. Collected: 02-Oct-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: JCR161 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445846.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus tanezumi. Collected: 24-Jul-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: MG103 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445880.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus norvegicus. Collected: 06-Jul-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: DL50 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445877.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus norvegicus. Collected: 06-Aug-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: JCR261 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445847.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus tanezumi. Collected: 23-Oct-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: JCR308 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445848.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus tanezumi. Collected: 19-Nov-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: DL28 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445849.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus norvegicus. Collected: 18-Jun-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: DL53 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445850.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus norvegicus. Collected: 06-Aug-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: DL1-90 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445851.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus tanezumi. Collected: 16-Dec-2021. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: PM35 (Orthohantavirus fugongense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445870.1. Country: China. Host: Eothenomys cachinus. Collected: 21-Jul-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: PM33 (Orthohantavirus fugongense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445869.1. Country: China. Host: Eothenomys cachinus. Collected: 21-Jul-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: PM3 (Orthohantavirus fugongense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445868.1. Country: China. Host: Eothenomys cachinus. Collected: 20-Jul-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: PM2 (Orthohantavirus fugongense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445867.1. Country: China. Host: Eothenomys cachinus. Collected: 20-Jul-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: HQ105 (Orthohantavirus luxiense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445872.1. Country: China. Host: Eothenomys miletus. Collected: 20-Feb-2022. Segment(s): L. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: MLP6 (Orthohantavirus caobangense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445860.1. Country: China. Host: Anourosorex squamipes. Collected: 19-Jul-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: GS326 (Orthohantavirus luxiense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445857.1. Country: China. Host: Eothenomys cachinus. Collected: 14-Oct-2023. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: MLP71 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445840.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus andamanensis. Collected: 19-Jul-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: MG57 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445839.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus tanezumi sladeni. Collected: 06-Jul-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: MG44 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445838.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus tanezumi sladeni. Collected: 06-Jul-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: MG1 (Orthohantavirus seoulense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445837.1. Country: China. Host: Rattus norvegicus. Collected: 06-Jul-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: GS226 (Orthohantavirus luxiense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445855.1. Country: China. Host: Eothenomys cachinus. Collected: 02-Oct-2023. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: GS1-171 (Orthohantavirus caobangense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445865.1. Country: China. Host: Anourosorex squamipes. Collected: 05-Aug-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: GS1-170 (Orthohantavirus caobangense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445864.1. Country: China. Host: Anourosorex squamipes. Collected: 05-Aug-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: MG95 (Orthohantavirus caobangense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445861.1. Country: China. Host: Anourosorex squamipes. Collected: 06-Jul-2024. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: GS300 (Orthohantavirus luxiense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445856.1. Country: China. Host: Eothenomys cachinus. Collected: 14-Oct-2023. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: HQ276 (Orthohantavirus luxiense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445854.1. Country: China. Host: Eothenomys miletus. Collected: 05-May-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: GS1-165 (Orthohantavirus caobangense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445862.1. Country: China. Host: Anourosorex squamipes. Collected: 05-Aug-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: GS1-168 (Orthohantavirus caobangense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445863.1. Country: China. Host: Anourosorex squamipes. Collected: 05-Aug-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: HQ243 (Orthohantavirus luxiense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445853.1. Country: China. Host: Eothenomys miletus. Collected: 05-May-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] ncbi-virus (A1) "Sequence: PM40 (Orthohantavirus fugongense) — China" NCBI GenBank — orthohantavirus sequence records (E-utilities), 2026-05-04

Summary: GenBank accession PX445871.1. Country: China. Host: Eothenomys cachinus. Collected: 21-Jul-2022. Segment(s): ?. Deposited: 2026/05/04.


[PUBLIC] mastodon-hantavirus (C3) "DIRECT Hantavirus : en cas d’épidémie, le stock de masques suffisant pour protéger la France pendant "minimum trois mois" # Hantavirus..." Mastodon #hantavirus (mastodon.social) — real-time social commentary, 2026-05-13

Summary: DIRECT Hantavirus : en cas d’épidémie, le stock de masques suffisant pour protéger la France pendant "minimum trois mois" # Hantavirus Une patiente testée positive à l’hantavirus est actuellement en réanimation, a annoncé ce mardi la ministre de la Santé. En tout, vingt-deux cas contacts sont par ailleurs "hospitalisés" ou "en cours... https://www. midilibre.fr/2026/05/13/direct -hantavirus-vingt-deux-cas-contacts-francais-hospitalises-ou-en-cours-dhospitalisation-dont-trois-adolescents-13369195.php Wed, 13 May 2026 11:40:54 +0200


[PUBLIC] mastodon-hantavirus (C3) "Appena due settimane fa l'Italia NON ha partecipato all'esercitazione OMS/WHO per la gestione coordinata di una nuova pandemia; il piano..." Mastodon #hantavirus (mastodon.social) — real-time social commentary, 2026-05-13

Summary: Appena due settimane fa l'Italia NON ha partecipato all'esercitazione OMS/WHO per la gestione coordinata di una nuova pandemia; il piano pandemico NON è mai stato aggiornato...ma il governo # Meloni giura che siamo pronti per l' # hantavirus . Non so voi, ma io sono preoccupato.


[PUBLIC] mastodon-hantavirus (C3) "Clavijo redobla el ataque contra el Gobierno por la crisis del hantavirus: “Han ofrecido arrogancia, prepotencia, caciquismo y mentiras”..." Mastodon #hantavirus (mastodon.social) — real-time social commentary, 2026-05-13

Summary: Clavijo redobla el ataque contra el Gobierno por la crisis del hantavirus: “Han ofrecido arrogancia, prepotencia, caciquismo y mentiras” https:// fed.brid.gy/r/https://elpais.c om/sociedad/2026-05-13/clavijo-redobla-el-ataque-contra-el-gobierno-han-ofrecido-arrogancia-prepotencia-caciquismo-y-mentiras.html